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We consider the implications of the Covid-19 crisis for the theory and practice of 
governance.  We define ‘governance’ as the process through which, in the case 
of a given entity or polity, resources are allocated, decisions made and policies 
implemented, with a view to ensuring the effectiveness of its operations in the 
face of risks in its environment.  Core to this, we argue, is the organisation of 
knowledge through public institutions, including the legal system.  Covid-19 
poses a particular type of ‘Anthropogenic’ risk which arises when organised 
human activity triggers feedback effects from the natural environment.  As such 
it requires the concerted mobilisation of knowledge and a directed response from 
governments and international agencies.  In this context, neoliberal theories and 
practices, which emphasise the self-adjusting properties of systems of governance 
in response to external shocks, are going to be put to the test.  In states’ varied 
responses to Covid-19 to date it is already possible to observe some trends.  One 
of them is the widespread mischaracterisation of the measures taken to address 
the epidemic at the point of its emergence in the Chinese city of Wuhan in January 
and February 2020.  Public health measures of this kind, rather than constituting 
a ‘state of exception’ in which legality is set aside, are informed by practices 
which originated in the welfare or social states of industrialised countries, and 
which were successful in achieving a ‘mortality revolution’ in the course of the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries.  Relearning this history would seem to be 
essential for the future control of pandemics and other Anthropogenic risks. 
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The initial focus of research on the SARS-CoV-2 virus1 and the disease it has 
generated, Covid-19, 2 was devoted to understanding its virology, 3 that is, its 
biological nature and origins, and its epidemiology,4 that is, its infectivity and 
diffusion among the human population.  As the virus spread worldwide, efforts 
to contain it were studied from the point of view of the behavioural sciences, with 
psychology to the fore.5  Less studied to this point has been what we call here the 
governance of Covid-19.  We use a broad understanding of the term ‘governance’ 
to refer to the processes and systems through which decisions are made and 
implemented within a given polity or entity, with a view to ensuring the 
effectiveness of its operations in the face of risks present in its environment.  We 
set out the implications of governance theory, so defined, for the way in which 
the public health response to Covid-19 crisis has been managed to date, and for 
how we might expect responses to unfold in coming months and years.   
 
Covid-19 poses in an acute form the issue at the core of governance research, 
namely the collective action problem: while the incidence and effects of the virus 
are not uniformly felt across populations, 6  the risks it poses can only be 
effectively addressed by a group-level response.7  In the psychological literature 
on Covid-19, discussion has focused on role of biases and heuristics in shaping 
responses to the virus among populations, and on the tools available to 
governments in ‘nudging’ their behaviour.  This focus neglects the role played by 
institutions, both public and private, in framing the way that risks of the kind 
posed by Covid-19 are understood and managed.  To understand how policies are 
made and implemented in a context such as the Covid-19 crisis, additional 
disciplinary perspectives, drawn from the social sciences including applied 
research in law and political economy, can usefully be drawn on. 
 
From a governance perspective, the risks and challenges posed by Covid-19 were 
neither unprecedented nor unexpected.  They were predictable and, indeed, 
predicted.8  Pandemics have occurred throughout human history, but they are not 
random events. 9  Their incidence is closely correlated with trends in human 
behaviour which are institutionally framed: the rise of trade, the associated 
movement of peoples, and resulting inequalities of income and resources.  The 
response to pandemics has also been shaped by human institutions and in 
particular by the emergence of a particular kind of state – a welfare or social state 
– with the capacity, among other things, to mobilise the resources needed to 
control infectious diseases and manage their consequences.  Here the term ‘social 
state’ (État social, Sozialstaat) better captures the full range of governmental 
functions involved in the management of social and economic risks, which 




social security law, than the term ‘welfare state’ which is commonly used in the 
British context.10 
 
Although the Covid-19 crisis is still unfolding, it is already possible to observe 
striking differences in countries’ responses to it, and in outcomes.11   States differ 
in the aims they have adopted in managing the disease, on a spectrum ranging 
from repression to mitigation and accommodation. They also differ in the means 
used to implement these aims, from direct enforcement through regulatory 
instructions and criminal sanctions, to more indirect encouragement and 
persuasion.  At this relatively early stage in the development of the Covid-19 
pandemic, it is not possible to state with any certainty how differences in states’ 
responses may be related to their differing degrees of success in countering the 
effects of the virus.12  Cross-national data on infection and mortality rates are not 
currently available in a standardised form. Because of differences in testing 
regimes and in approaches to the certification of causes of death, it is not possible 
to make systematic cross-national comparisons.  This lack of comparability  
makes the identification of causal links between institutional interventions and 
health outcomes a problematic undertaking, but even with better data it will not 
be straightforward to design empirical research capable of isolating the relevant 
effects.13   
 
However, some emerging trends can be clearly identified.  On 15 October 2020, 
China, where the first outbreak of Covid-19 was documented,14 had recorded a 
total of 4,739 deaths out of a global total of over one million cases.15  The USA 
had recorded 216,904, the highest total of any country; the UK had recorded 
43,245, the highest of any country in Europe.16  In both countries, the public 
health response to the coronavirus was delayed and its operationalisation has been 
fragmented and incomplete.17  What accounts for this failure?   
 
A range of non-pharmaceutical interventions (‘NPIs’), including quarantines, 
cordons sanitaires, and test, trace, isolate and support programmes, were adopted 
in China in its response to the first reports of the Covid-19 outbreak in the final 
days of 2019, and were then replicated in varying degrees in a number of other 
countries in January and February 2020, in each case making it possible for the 
spread of the disease to be locally contained.18  One explanation for the failure of 
other countries rapidly to adopt similar measures is that China’s reaction was in 
various ways exceptional: a product, alternatively, of an illiberal state regime,19 
or of a communitarian culture rooted in Confucian values.20  Further research, 
focusing on the combination of political and social conditions which framed the 
Chinese response, may in due course throw light on these claims.  The Chinese 
response, while the first and the most extensive in terms of scale and, 
understandably, the one which has so far received most attention, is not unique.  




wave by a wide variety of NPIs include Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam, Rwanda, the 
Nordic countries (other than Sweden), New Zealand, Jordan and Uruguay:21 in 
other words, countries from all continents, regions and cultures, and spanning the 
whole spectrum of political systems from liberal democracies to one-party 
states.22   
 
Rather than focusing on loosely defined variables such as ‘culture’, we wish to 
draw attention to a simpler and, we suggest, more straightforward explanation for 
the success of the measures taken to control the virus in the minority of countries 
where this has been achieved. This is that the measures taken in China and 
elsewhere were not new, except, in the Chinese case, in the scale of their 
application.  Each one of them has antecedents in the practice of the countries of 
the global North, which, in the case of Europe, go back to the late Middle Ages.  
Many of them were adopted with success in Britain (among other countries) as 
recently as the turn of the twentieth century, and played a central part in the 
construction of a welfare state which placed the protection of public health at its 
core.23 These same policies were later embedded in global strategies for disease 
eradication which were formulated and disseminated by the World Health 
Organization (‘WHO’).24  Yet in the current crisis, the roots of these practices 
have been largely forgotten in their countries of origin. 
 
What has to be explained, we will suggest, is not why China followed a particular 
path, but why other countries, in particular the UK, given its history, did not.  We 
will argue that the failure of certain states, including the UK, to respond more 
effectively to the immediate challenge posed by Covid-19, has roots in 
transformations of systems of governance which have been occurring since the 
late 1970s. These changes have been informed by theories of governance which 
have cast doubt on the effectiveness and legitimacy of public interventions in 
managing social and economic risks.  As these theories took hold, the welfare 
state of the mid-twentieth century gave way to a very different model which we 
describe below as the ‘neoliberal state’.  As it unfolds, the Covid-19 crisis will 
present us with an opportunity to assess the operation of these theories and the 
practices which they have informed.  This paper makes a start on that process of 
assessment. 
 
Our analysis proceeds as follows. Section 2 below sets out the elements of a 
theory of governance for Covid-19.  While we can identify different streams of 
research on governance, alternatively stressing its institutional, systemic and 
conventional dimensions, for present purposes we think it is more important to 
stress what these approaches have in common, which is a focus on governance as 
process of learning in response to risk.  With that specific point in mind, section 
3 outlines the nature of the risks which the Covid-19 crisis has posed.  Here we 




derived only partially from the underlying material (viral and epidemiological) 
nature of the Covid-19 disease; also important are its origins in human 
institutions.  In section 4 we turn to an analysis of governmental responses to 
Covid-19.  We focus on the Chinese case as it was both the earliest response and 
also, to a greater or lesser extent, the template for responses elsewhere, some of 
which have actively sought to replicate it, while others have to varying degrees 
rejected or departed from it.  Then in section 5 we discuss how far the Chinese 
experience can be thought of as exceptional in the light of the history and recent 
practice of disease control.  Here we make the point that measures take in China 
were largely based on precedents from experience in other regions of the world 
including western Europe in general and the UK in particular, and on guidance 
from the World Health Organization which embedded these lessons in 
international standards.  In section 6 we offer a concluding assessment.  We return 
to theory and consider some of the lessons of the period of institutional learning 
that can so far be observed around Covid-19, and evaluate implications of the 
crisis for the future of the social state. 
 
2. A theory of governance for Covid-19 
 
A. Governance within and beyond the state 
 
In defining governance as the process through which, in a given entity or polity, 
resources are allocated, decisions made and policies implemented with a view to 
ensuring its continuing effectiveness, we have deliberately chosen a broad and 
generic reading of the term.  Narrower definitions exist for particular subfields 
such as ‘corporate’, ‘public’ or ‘contractual’ governance, in which emphasis is 
placed on field-specific mechanisms of accountability and control.  Our reading 
of ‘governance’ is intended to convey a wider sense of the processes through 
which social and economic life is organised and reproduced over time in a range 
of settings.25   
 
What we have just referred to as ‘processes’ have been described using various 
other terms, including ‘institutions’, ‘systems’  and ‘conventions’.  These 
alternative formulations place varying degrees of emphasis, respectively, on the 
normative, adaptive and epistemic aspects of governance.  Thus the term 
‘institution’, following Ostrom, North and Aoki, 26 can be usefully deployed to 
refer to routines, practices and discourses, of differing degrees of formality, 
which have a rule-based or other normative character.  Luhmann’s concept of 
‘system’27 captures the self-organising and adaptive quality of discourses and 
practices which adjust over time to changes in their external context or 
environment, influencing it in their turn.  This is far from being an automatic 
process, nor does it produce results which are optimal or, indeed, in any sense 




continue to dominate certain governance sub-fields such as the neoclassical 
economic analysis of law.28  ‘Conventions’ in the sense identified by Lewis29 are 
norms and practices which embed and retain common knowledge among 
members of a community. Although these distinct approaches make different 
assumptions about objects of study and modes of inquiry, they share a focus on 
cognition, or the organisation of knowledge, as the basis of social order, and on 
evolution, or the mutual adjustment of systems and environment, as the 
mechanism of social change.  These are concepts which can serve a unifying role 
across the otherwise disparate field of governance research.30  
 
The ‘state’ is a contested concept in research on governance, but in practice is 
never far away.  ‘Governance’ is closely related both to ‘government’, indicating 
the directive and coordinating function of the state, and to what Foucault calls 
‘governmentality’, the art or technique of government, which includes embedding 
in governed populations the assumptions and beliefs which make such public 
action possible.31  Thus both ‘governance’ and ‘governmentality’ are concerned 
with the state, understood as a central sovereign agent with unique powers of rule-
making and enforcement,32 without restricting their attention to it.  Beyond the 
state there are many other forms of order including social norms, customs and 
routines; ‘informal institutions’ in North’s sense,33 or conventions in Lewis’.34  
These sources of normativity, sometimes termed ‘informal’ to distinguish them 
for the more ‘formal’ apparatus of the state, coexist with, and may complement 
or oppose, as the case may, the operation of publicly instituted norms including 
those created by the legal system.35   
 
Foucault’s notion of governmentality seeks to bring into the open the 
‘biopolitical’ techniques used by the state to induce compliance among the 
population of the governed, and to identify the sources and effects of the state’s 
power.36  The concept of biopolitics refers here to the assumption by the state of 
means of control over the conditions of living of populations.  Both the ‘prison’37 
and the ‘clinic’38exemplify the state’s disciplinary reach.  But Foucault’s account 
of ‘power’ is nuanced: it is not simply 'repressive in character’, but ‘linked to the 
generation of new ways living’ and ‘the production of knowledge’.39 
 
Among the mechanisms or modes of ‘private’ governance, market-based 
exchange occupies a distinct, and in contemporary governance theory as well as 
in practice, an elevated position.  In certain recent traditions of social and political 
theory, the market is seen as a mode of resource allocation which is not just 
separate from but superior to and opposed to the state.  The terms ‘neoliberal’ and 
‘libertarian’ which are often used in association with these claims are contested 
to the point where some have suggested that it is not helpful to use them.40  In his 
lectures on ‘The Birth of Biopolitics’, given at the Collège de France in 1979, 




reaction, in the United States, to Roosevelt’s New Deal, and in Europe to the use 
of Keynesian economics employing the techniques of demand management, 
along with related forms of ‘legal ‘interventionism’41 which were driven by the 
need for post-1945 reconstruction.  Neoliberalism saw these interventions as 
departures from the laissez-faire tradition of the nineteenth century, which it 
sought to restore; thus neoliberalism was a renewal of liberal forms of 
governmentality which had been merely suspended under the ‘emergency’ 
conditions of global depression and war.42     
 
At the same time, neoliberalism had an affirmative dimension.  Neoliberal 
policies were informed by theories which to varying degrees argued for the 
priority of the market, exemplified by the price mechanism, over the state, 
exemplified by centralised planning, in the allocation of resources.43  But while 
the concept of a limited state was central to the way in which neoliberal theories 
constructed their account of government, practice was different.  Thus a core 
message of Foucault’s notion of ‘governmentality’ is that the market order is far 
from being ‘natural’ or self-sustaining; it must be actively created by the state.44  
Hence to talk of a ‘neoliberal state’ is far from being a contradiction in terms.   
 
What is contradictory within neoliberal thought and practice is the idea that these 
ends can be achieved by modelling the state on the market.45   In the ‘law and 
economics’ and ‘public choice’ schools, the market model is generalised to the 
point where it becomes the organising principle for all other social domains, 
including the state. 46   This position can be contrasted with ‘systemic’ and 
‘institutionalist’ positions, in which the market and the state, if connected through 
their coevolution, are nonetheless distinct in their modes of operation.  
Luhmann’s theory of social systems emphasises their separation, noting that 
attempts to infuse the legal system (and by extension the state more generally) 
with an economic (that is, exchange-orientated) logic often encounter resistance.  
Law itself ‘must not belong to the type of goods or services that can be bought in 
the economic system’; the law is one of the ‘conditions which make money 
transactions possible’ but which operates according to its own logic of 
adjudication and legislation.47  Luhmann’s systemic perspective on coevolution 
makes the point that the market ultimately depends for its mode of operation on 
non-market forms of economic and social organisation.  From a somewhat 
different methodological perspective, Aoki’s ‘comparative institutional analysis’ 
arrives at a similar conclusion: the internal logic of the market domain, in which 
agents trade private endowments, is distinct from that of the state or ‘polity’, in 
which government acts as a central agent with a set of action choices that are 






These contributions emphasise the importance for governance and 
governmentality of institutional arrangements which posit or assume a state-
market division or ‘public-private divide’.  Where exactly the boundary between 
the state and the market is drawn, and whether the boundary between them is seen 
as in varying degrees as ‘watertight’ or ‘porous’, will vary in practice according 
to the institutional histories of particular societies and entities.  The contemporary 
erosion of the public-private divide, which is visible in the extension of the market 
logic of resource allocation into the public realm as a consequence of ‘new public 
management’ and ‘quasi-market’ modes of organisation, is a source of weakness 
in the neoliberal state, which threatens to undermine the capacity to provide a 
range of collective goods, including those which the market itself relies on to 
operate.49 
 
B. Cognition, evolutionary learning, and collective action  
 
Governance can have many purposes, depending on context: ensuring efficiency 
in the allocation of resources, maximising returns to certain ‘stakeholders’, 
aligning social and economic outcomes with policies, and so on.  However, a 
more generic understanding of the function of governance would be that it is the 
means by which a given entity or polity (organisation, company, state) ensures 
the effectiveness of its modes of operation, and hence its survival, in the face of 
a changing context.  Put this way, there is a relationship of mutual interaction 
between the internal modes of operation of a ‘system’ and the risks (‘threats’, 
‘hazards’ ‘challenges’ and ‘shocks’) present in its ‘environment’.  A system’s 
capacity for cognition – that is, its capacity to translate and retain information 
from its environment, and thereby to embed the lessons of past successes and 
failures in its internal processes – determines what Luhmann, 50  adapting a 
biological concept, refers to as its autopoiesis or capacity for self-reproduction.  
Aoki captures a similar idea when he refers to the corporation as an economic 
institution with ‘self-organising’ properties based around the ‘collective 
cognition’ of its members.51 
 
Although governance can serve many ends, an overarching goal, which describes 
numerous more specific or concrete applications, is to arrive at solutions to the 
collective action problem.  This arises in any context where, as Ostrom puts it, 
‘individuals in inter-dependent situations face choices in which the maximization 
of short-term self-interest yields outcomes leaving all participants worse off than 
feasible alternatives’.52  As she explains, the problem has been referred to in many 
ways: the ‘public goods problem’, ‘free-riding’, ‘credible commitments’, 
‘hostages’, ‘tragedy of the commons’, ‘exchanges of threats’. It also has multiple 
applications including domestic politics, international relations, the theory of the 
firm, contractual performance, management practice, environmental protection, 




problems at multiple levels: in the responses of populations to control measures; 
in the willingness of citizens to fund, through taxation, the interventions needed 
for a coordinated response; and in the preparedness of states to cooperate in steps 
taken to address the disease’s global-level effects. 
  
Collective action has been theorised using numerous models, of which the much-
studied prisoner’s dilemma game, in which individual and collective interests 
radically diverge, is just one.  Although a static analysis of the prisoner’s dilemma 
can lead to the conclusion that social cooperation of the kind needed to resolve 
the collective action problem is diminishingly rare, it is not hard to find empirical 
evidence of solutions to what Ostrom, generalising from the original prisoner’s 
dilemma model, refers to as ‘social dilemmas’.54   In the synthesis of evolutionary 
and epistemic game theory presented by Gintis, the  mutual defection scenario 
commonly associated with the prisoner’s dilemma can be avoided where there is 
a ‘high degree of intersubjective belief consistency’, enabling players to 
coordinate their responses.55  While there is nothing in static game theoretical 
models to guarantee this, in repeated games agents can learn to correlate their 
behaviour, taking their cue from public signals which serve as repositories of 
common knowledge.56   
 
Thus public representation systems, such as those of the law, are one of the 
preconditions for reconciling individual autonomy with social cooperation.57  As 
a result, the need to find solutions to the collective action problem inevitably 
involves the state; indeed, it can be thought of as providing the ‘core of the 
justification’ for it.58 At the same time, the multifarious solutions to the collective 
action problem draw on social practice as a source of learning: ‘successive 
generations have added to the stock of everyday knowledge about how to instil 
productive norms of behaviour… and to craft rules to support collective action 
that produces public goods’.59  From this point of view, the interdependence of 
norms originating in social practice with those embedded in the formal 
institutions of the state becomes the focus of attention. 
 
The capacity of the state, as the ‘focal’ or ‘sovereign’ agent, to retrieve, store and 
disseminate information which originates in social and customary practices, 
thereby becomes a critical determinant of the effective resolution of risks and 
shocks.  In this process, the role of the state is not simply to record the preferences 
of social actors or to ratify the probabilistic (‘Bayesian’) updating of their beliefs 
in response to new information.  The state’s monopoly over force gives it a role 
in stabilising norms as well as in allowing for their adjustment over time: if the 
lessons of history are to be embedded in practice, knowledge retention and 
transmission must be at least partially static.  At the same time, the state has the 
power to alter social practices, by shifting perceptions of what counts as 




benefits from compliance with the publicly enunciated norms of the legal 
system.60   
 
The state’s role in the accumulation and retention of learning is emphasised by 
North in his historical analysis of the role of institutions in the rise of capitalism.  
In his account, human beings ‘come to understand their environment’ though 
‘mental constructs derived from experience, contemporary and historical’.61  He 
was referring here not just to the experience of individuals but to the ‘cumulative 
learning of a society embodied in language, human memory, and symbol storage 
systems [including] beliefs, myths, ways of doing things that make up the culture 
of a society’.  Human learning, so defined, determines ‘societal performance’ 
including ‘the performance of economies’.62   
 
North’s account directs our attention to systems which allow for the retention and 
preservation of knowledge, understood as information which has been applied to 
a particular context and embeds the lessons of that experience.  Hayek’s 
theorisation of the price mechanism as embedded learning in this sense has been 
particularly influential for its emphasis on the private and decentralised nature of 
the knowledge underlying complex social systems such as the market.  In ‘The 
use of knowledge in society’ Hayek argued that the knowledge underlying 
economic exchange is decentralised, in the sense of belonging to individual 
agents: ‘each individual has some advantage over all others in that he possesses 
unique information of which beneficial use might be made, but of which use can 
be made only if the decisions depending on it are left to him or are made with his 
active cooperation’.63   At the same time, the effectiveness of any individual’s 
action depends on ‘events which happen beyond the horizon of his immediate 
knowledge’.  Prices convey the information needed for rational action in a 
shorthand form which encapsulates a necessarily more complex context.  Price is 
a ‘kind of symbol’ which transmits ‘only the most essential information’ to those 
who need it.64    
 
Hayek describes the knowledge embedded in prices as ‘by its nature’ beyond 
anything that can be captured by statistics and thereby ‘conveyed to any central 
authority in statistical form’.65  It is essential to its successful operation that the 
price system works in the absence  of centrally coordinated action, ‘without an 
order being issued’, and that it is not itself a mechanism that has been consciously 
designed: it is ‘one of those formations’ – other terms used by Hayek include 
‘formulas’, ‘symbols’, ‘rules’, ‘habits’ and ‘institutions’ – which society ‘had 
learned to use… after stumbling upon it without first understanding it’.66  In his 
later works, including The Constitution of Liberty67 and Law, Legislation and 
Liberty, 68 this idea matured into a fully-fledged theory of social order which 
unremittingly emphasised the need to place limits on government action.  




decentralised or ‘spontaneous’ orders of the kind exemplified by the price 
mechanism, state intervention in the economy was bound to be ‘ad hoc’ and 
‘arbitrary.69  It was not possible ‘to improve a spontaneous order by revising the 
general rules on which it rests’ or by introducing specific rules which would 
‘deprive its members of the possibility of using their knowledge for their own 
purposes’.70  The welfare state, as it presupposed specific interventions across a 
range of economic and social settings, made the arbitrary exercise of power 
inevitable, setting societies on a ‘road to serfdom’.71 
 
Hayek’s theorisation of spontaneous order is open to question, however, in locating 
social learning entirely beyond the state.  Information and knowledge may begin 
as individually-held and decentralised, but the institutions through which they are 
‘stored’ often have a collective or public character.72  Markets which come closest 
to the competitive ideal in the sense of allocating scarce resources to alternate uses 
at least overall cost are also those, as Coase points out, ‘for which an intricate 
system of rules and regulations would normally be needed’.73  What he refers to as 
‘governmental regulation’74 might be just one potential source; self-regulation by 
economic actors is another and, historically, was the initial mode of governance of 
most stock exchanges.  But even this form of self-regulation, which depended 
significantly on internal governance and the effects of reputation in a limited circle 
of traders, co-existed with public protection of property and contract rights.  
Today’s financial markets, which operate at a national or transnational scale and 
rely heavily on anonymised and even automated trading, are also intensively 
regulated through a combination of contractual and statutory norms.75 
 
A second case of spontaneous order discussed by Hayek is private law, with a focus 
on the English-origin common or judge-made law.  Just as prices in a market 
emerge from the interaction of buyers and sellers, so rules in a common law system 
are derived from decisions of judges in individual cases.  The common law is, in 
Hayek’s terminology, a type of ‘catallaxy’ in which decentralised decision making 
ensures a rich information content to rules.  Statutory interventions or commands 
upset the coherence of the common law and reduce its informational content.76   
 
Hayek’s theory is consistent with many observed features of the common law, 
including the presence of mechanisms of knowledge retention (legal precedent) 
and error correction (appeal and litigation) which enable it to adapt to changing 
features of its economic and political context without the apparent need for 
centralised direction.77  However, since the common law, and private law more 
generally, are an emanation of the legal system and hence of the state,78 the idea 
that private law and the market are mutually supportive forms of spontaneous order 





A Hayekian response might be that the state is not monolithic: there are elements 
of emergent order within the legal system and the state more generally, and these 
need to be preserved in the face of tendencies for governments to use ‘command 
and control’ regulation to achieve their goals.  Yet this is clearly not the whole 
story.  Judge-made law may have certain adaptive features, but beyond knowledge 
retention and error correction these also include ‘frozen accidents’79 and ‘path 
dependencies’80 which end up triggering statutory interventions.    
 
In so far as the judge-made law has something in common with other instances of 
evolutionary adaptation in society and nature, it is part of a family of forms which 
use ‘blind’ or, as it is sometimes called, ‘direct’ fitting, implying repeated iterations 
based on variation, selection and retention, to encode features of the external 
environment in their internal modes of operation.  Processes of this kind ‘produce 
solutions that are mistakenly interpreted in terms of elegant design principles but 
in fact reflect the interdigitation of “mindless” optimisation processes and the 
structure of the world’ (Hasson et al., 2019: 417; our emphasis). 81   Direct-fit 
approaches to learning can be remarkably effective in finding solutions which 
match an ‘encoding architecture’ to its context, but to work they require several far 
from trivial conditions: ‘overproduction with variation’, ‘inheritance’ or ‘retention’ 
involving the inter-temporal storing of information, and ‘selection’ through 
environmental or external influence of some kind.  Even then, they are not bound 
to produce optimal outcomes: variations may be too limited in their range and 
number, or selective pressures too weak or contingent in their timing, to purge 
errors.  When approximately effective solutions do emerge they will often reflect 
a range of localised responses to a global problem.  Thus the best that can be 
expected from ‘direct fitting’ is a range of outcomes of different degrees of 
optimisation which may not be transferrable across context: diversity, but not 
necessarily optimality.82  
 
Evolutionary adaptation in nature is ‘an interactive optimisation process’ which 
has produced a rich diversity of speciation but only ‘over trillions of generations 
and billions of years’.83  Human societies have by necessity developed modes of 
institutional evolution which work on much shorter time spans.    Examples of 
rapid adjustment through  legal and governmental responses to external shocks, or 
‘punctuated equilibria’,84 to use the relevant biological analogy, alongside more 
incremental modes of adaptation, are not hard to find.  Yet part of the success of 
legal and other variants of human-institutional evolution lies in their use of multiple 
mechanisms alongside ‘direct fitting’: these forms of what might be called 
‘directed fitting’ include legislation and administrative intervention to correct 
evolutionary ‘dead ends’.85  These mechanisms rely on the state’s ‘focal’ power or 
‘authority’ to stabilise knowledge retention and transmission.  In contrast to the 
paradigmatically ‘horizontal’ transmission mechanisms of the market, in which 




formal equality, the state depends on vertical modes of knowledge reception and 
transmission to achieve its effects.  Even under conditions of contemporary 
globalisation, the world isn’t truly ‘flat’.86 
 
Social evolution is never entirely ‘blind’: it is precisely because human minds can 
observe attempts at direct fitting and recognise how far they fall short of 
optimisation that other modes of adaptive change have come to be at policy 
makers’ disposal.  This is why ‘spontaneous orders’ in Hayek’s sense account for 
a small and diminishing proportion of the rules and policies developed by 
contemporary states for dealing with social, economic and environmental risks in 
their environments, regardless of whether systems have a common law (that is, 
English and American) or civil law legal origin.87   
 
C. From governance to governmentality: contradictions and pathologies of 
the neoliberal state 
 
Three decades or so after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the resulting emergence of 
the ‘Washington consensus’ around the virtues of market- led economic growth, 
virtually all countries are ‘market states’88 which seek to use the institutional means 
at their disposal to create, embed and, to varying degrees, regulate private-sector 
market activity.  No market of any significant scale or scope operates without the 
support of the state in some form or another, but the role of state is not confined to 
protecting property rights which in some sense pre-exist it.89  The state defines 
property for its own purposes of taxation and regulation, 90  and supports 
technological innovation through subsidies and procurement.91  States differ in 
their regulatory capabilities, with the more highly-developed industrial economies 
tending also to have the greater state capacity, and in their willingness to regulate 
market transactions ex ante through consumer and worker protection laws and to 
alter them ex post through taxation and redistribution.  These ‘varieties of 
capitalism’92 notwithstanding, in today’s world markets and states are virtually 
everywhere intertwined: markets depend on states to guarantee their conditions of 
existence.  This includes a multiplicity of public goods extending from the 
collective provision of health and education to a functioning rule of law.  The mid-
twentieth century ‘welfare’ or ‘social’ state has to that extent been subsumed into 
the wider remit of maintaining the market order; but managing the risks arising 
from industrialisation in a way that makes a capitalist economy more sustainable 
has always been part of its mode of operation.93  Conversely, the welfare state, no 
less than other state operations, depends on the surpluses generated by industry and 
trade for its fiscal stability and hence for the means to finance the public goods 
which it provides.94 
 
The market state may have become virtually ubiquitous under conditions under 




Particularly unstable are states in which neoliberal theories and practices dominate 
to the point of marginalising alternatives.  A Foucauldian perspective on 
‘governmentality’ highlights some of neoliberalism’s contradictions.  Neoliberal 
thinking elevates the market over the state in ways which threaten to undermine its 
core capabilities. When influential modes of thought deny the existence of a public  
or collective ‘interest’,95 characterise public officials as ‘knaves’,96 and refer to the 
state as the ‘grabbing hand’,97 something more than a simple mischaracterisation 
is occurring.  The neoliberal state seems compelled to deny the need for its own 
existence, while all the time extending the scope and reach of its interventions.  
 
The neoliberal state is of necessity an interventionist one because the goal of pure 
or perfect competition, not being in any sense a natural situation but one which 
must be actively instituted, is forever receding from view.  Indeed, since Foucault 
first formulated his theory of governmentality in the 1970s, the ‘juridification’ of 
social and economic life through regulatory interventions has only intensified.98  
The results include self-contradictions such as ‘libertarian paternalism’,99 in which 
targeted regulatory interventions seek to reproduce the autonomous exchanges 
which individuals would have arrived at had they been capable of the rational 
action which economic theory ascribes to them.  The one choice which is never 
open to the individual in the neoliberal state is to opt out of the market-instrumental 
logic which is its default mode of governance. 
 
The dilemmas of the market state reach the point of becoming pathologies when 
there is no longer a meaningful boundary between the public and private spheres.  
Presented by neoliberal theories as a way of protecting the market from the state,100 
the concept of the public-private divide, which has a long history in western social 
and political thought, also protected the state from the market. 101   Once the 
‘exchange conceptualisation’ of government and law takes hold,102 the public 
sphere becomes an extension of the market, and subject to the same logic of 
resource allocation through private exchange and the principle of willingness to 
pay.   
 
The founding beliefs of the ‘Virginia’ and ‘Chicago’ Schools moved from the 
academy to the practice of the executive and judicial branches of government in 
the United States from the 1970s onwards and spread from there to achieve global 
influence after the fall of the Soviet Union and its satellites.103  As the state is 
colonised by the logic of the market in this way, it starts to lose the capabilities it 
needs to support the market’s functioning.  Even as basic a state operation as the 
protection of property rights is undermined if the norm of legality in adjudication, 
implying the general application of abstract legal rules, is replaced by the market 
principle of willingness to pay – and hence, the economic power of the dominant 
party – as the basis for resolving disputes. 104  In this context, what is called 




understood as the intrusion of the market into the domain of the state, a 
consequence of the erosion of the public-private divide.106   In the wake of the 
experience of transition systems exposed to ‘shock therapy’ in the early 1990s, 
even some of the foremost advocates of shrinking the state in the name of economic 
freedom came to the belated realisation that market was not self-sustaining: 
‘privatization is meaningless if you don’t have the rule of law’.107 
 
While the extremes of  ‘shock therapy’ were confined to transition systems, the 
‘austerity’ pursued across the global North following the global financial crisis of 
2008-9 followed a similar pattern of cutting back state capacity in the name of 
protecting the market.  If milder in their effects than the reforms administered to 
the former command economies, austerity policies diminished the risk-bearing 
capacity of the state by shrinking the provision of collective goods, including 
systems of public health.108  Thus the emergence of Covid-19 at the end of 2019 
came at a point when the neoliberal state was already in crisis.109 
 
3.  Covid-19 as Anthropogenic risk 
 
We now turn to a consideration of the nature of the risks to human health and the 
wider social order posed by Covid-19.  The essential point is that the Covid-19 
pandemic is not a random occurrence. Nor is it a ‘black swan’ event, indicating 
an ‘outlier’ that is ‘outside the realm of regular expectations, because nothing in 
the past can convincingly point to its possibility’.110  On the contrary, epidemics 
and pandemics such as Covid-19 have a recurring pattern throughout history 
which makes them statistically predictable.111  Pandemics are the combined effect 
of patterns in biological (genetic and phylogenetic) and human (social and 
institutional) evolution.112  More precisely, they are ‘Anthropogenic’ events in 
the sense of being triggered by the interaction of human activity with the wider 
environment, and the feedback effects engendered by over-use of natural 
resources.113 
 
While the genetic mutation which produced the Covid-19 virus may have been a 
random occurrence, the epidemic which then ensued was not.  Epidemics on or 
near the scale of Covid-19 have occurred at numerous points in the past, and are 
correlated to particular features of human activity which are themselves inter-
connected: commercial exploitation of natural resources, the spread of trade, 
movements of populations, and widening social inequalities.114   
 
The combined biological-institutional origins of the Covid-19 pandemic can be 
identified with some precision.  SARS-CoV-2 is one of a family of ‘zoonotic’ 
viruses which originate in animal species indigenous to densely forested parts of 
tropical and sub-tropical regions.  Others include HIV, which is currently thought 




west; the original SARS virus of 2003 (SARS-1); the 2009 H1N1 influenza virus; 
and the MERS virus which originated in the Middle East in 2015.115   These 
viruses circulate widely among animal populations and have a high rate of 
mutation, but on the whole they are not pathogenic to their hosts, with which they 
have coevolved across multiple generations.116   
 
Because it has not previously been present in human hosts, and so has not 
coevolved with genetic and phylogenetic features of the human species, there is 
a much more than trivial possibility that a novel zoonotic virus such as Covid-19 
will turn out to be pathogenic in varying degrees to human carriers.  There have 
almost certainly been numerous mutations in the past in the same family of 
viruses which had more or less insignificant impacts on their human hosts, and 
so went unnoticed.117  SARS-CoV-2 is much less lethal than SARS-1, but much 
more so than seasonal influenza.118  It is also far more infective than the original 
SARS virus, and hence more difficult to control, since the peak period of human-
to-human transmission occurs before its carriers show any symptoms.119  While 
these features of Covid-19 are the results of mutations which can be thought of 
as random events, what is not random is the exposure of human populations to 
the kind of risk which the virus represents.   
 
The precise chain of animal to human transmission in the case of Covid-19 is still 
not fully understood, but it is likely to have involved commercial exploitation of 
wild animals with their dense packing in markets in  close proximity to large 
numbers of people over prolonged periods of time.120   This form of exploitation 
has radically changed the risk profiles of novel viruses capable of ‘jumping’ into 
human populations.121  While human communities have coexisted with forest 
environments for millennia, traditional practices of crop and animal husbandry 
allowed for some degree of mutual accommodation between the human and 
animal species which shared these habitats.  Modern agricultural and industrial 
uses of the natural environment, by treating shared habitats as a resource available 
for human use, increase the risk of exposure to features of those environments 
which are pathogenic for human communities.  Put simply, the risk of a mutation 
producing a pathogen with the properties of Covid-19 is a function of increasing 
human exploitation of the natural environment.122  
 
The factors behind the transmission of SARS-CoV-2 within human populations 
should also be understood as the combined result biological and human-
institutional factors.  In common with earlier pandemics including the plague 
which first arrived in Europe in 1346, the smallpox pandemic which began in the 
seventeenth century, the cholera outbreaks which began in Europe in the 1820s , 
and the so-called ‘Spanish’ influenza of 1918-19, the worldwide spread of SARS-
CoV-2 would not have been possible without the existence of human transmission 




populations.123  The Covid-19 pandemic occurred at a time when trading between 
east Asia and the rest of the world was more open than it had been for several 
centuries.124  A combination of international business travel and tourism appears 
to have been responsible for the transmission of Covid-19 from China to Europe 
and then on to north America.   
 
The relationship between inequality and Covid-19 is complex but is becoming 
clearer over time as the epidemic unfolds.  It is not just that the virus has an 
unequal impact on groups by reference to their income, resources and socio-
economic status and hence comorbidity exposure; 125 pre-existing inequalities 
have exacerbated the spread of the disease in a number of ways, making it more 
difficult to control. 126  The incidence of the disease appears to be 
disproportionately high among populations exposed to low-quality housing and 
poor working conditions.  This is for a number of reasons including the ease with 
which the virus spreads in multi-member households and densely occupied 
working environments.127   
 
Thus in accounting for Covid-19 as a global epidemic and not simply an isolated 
viral mutation, social and human factors must be considered alongside biological 
ones.  Covid-19 can be thought of as an ‘Anthropogenic’ event in the sense of 
arising from human activities which are of a type and scale to produce feedback 
effects in the natural environment.  Climate change is one such event, which has 
relatively recently (since the middle decades of the twentieth century) shown 
signs of negative feedback which is sufficiently serious to begin to render certain 
regions barely inhabitable, or least not sustainably so.  Pandemics have a longer 
history which is approximately coterminous with beginnings of Eurasian proto-
industrialisation in the late Middle Ages.128  The Anthropocene is the core case 
of a process in which biological and material aspects of evolution interact with 
social and institutional ones.129  To institute a market economy is also to ‘organise 
nature’;130 thus as with climate change, Covid-19 is endogenous to social and 
institutional arrangements which permit the ‘exploitation’ of the natural world in 
the specific sense of the systematic under-pricing of environmental harms.131 
 
Anthropogenic risks such as those posed by Covid-19 raise issues of governance 
and governmentality in a highly acute form.  Market states in general, including 
those of a more neoliberal orientation, must address these risks if they are to 
maintain their own modes of operation and so ensure their self-reproduction; but 
neoliberal states can only do so by calling into question some core features of 
those modes of operation.  Not just a single collective response, but multiple 
responses, addressing the combined social and environmental causes of the 
pandemic, are required.  Yet the possibility of collective action on this scale is an 
outcome which the dominant philosophies of the neoliberal state have already 




zero-sum game, and systems will self-correct in response to external shocks, the 
scope for concerted or directed action is necessarily limited.  These philosophies, 
moreover, are not simply cultural artefacts. Over the course of the past four 
decades they have become increasingly, if not necessarily uniformly, embedded 
in mechanisms of governance and government in the workings of market states 
of all kinds, but above all those which most enthusiastically embraced the theory 
and practice of neoliberalism.   The same philosophy has informed work of the 
agencies charged with achieving international coordination.   These influences 
are apparent in the responses so far observed to the Covid-19 crisis. 
 
4. Governing Covid-19: the public health response 
 
A. The Wuhan measures: ‘all-of-government, all-of-society’  
 
We focus our analysis on the Chinese response to Covid-19 as it was not only the 
first in time but to varying degrees has provided the template for other countries’ 
reactions, if only, in some cases, by way of counter-response to or rejection of the 
Chinese model.  The Chinese government’s account of events is set out in a 
‘White Paper’, published by the State Council Information Office in June 2020.132  
The document largely incorporates the conclusions of a fact-finding mission 
conducted jointly by officials of the World Health Organization and the Chinese 
government in February 2020 (the ‘Joint Report’). 133  The WHO delegation 
included representatives from several countries including the USA.   
 
Neither the White Paper, nor the Joint Report, can be regarded as a definitive 
factual account of what occurred in Wuhan, and future research will be needed to 
verify some of the claims they make.134  It should be clear that the accounts they 
contain were framed by the institutional priorities of the organisations responsible 
for compiling them: the Chinese government and the WHO, respectively.  Our 
purpose in analysing them here, therefore, is not to present them as an objective 
history of events (although they both contain information of considerable 
interest), but as evidence of the interpretations which the Chinese authorities and 
the WHO have placed on the Wuhan episode; in other words, as evidence of 













(i) The Wuhan measures: overview 
 
The basic picture presented in the Joint Report and set out in more detail in the 
Chinese government’s White Paper identifies a series of stages to the response.  
In the first stage the virus was identified and the first steps taken to establishing 
its biological nature and effects.136  According to these two documents, the virus 
was first reported at the end of December 2019 in Wuhan, where medical 
professionals at one of the city’s hospitals identified a cluster of cases of 
pneumonia of an unknown cause.137  On 27 December a number of cases of a new 
SARS-type infection were notified to the Wuhan Jianghan Centre for Disease 
Prevention and Control and the Wuhan City Health Commission (WCHC).  On 
30 December the National Health Commission (NHC) began to undertake 
research into the virus and the following day it sent a team of experts to Wuhan 
to guide its response.  By 8 January the NHC had identified a novel coronavirus 
as the source of the disease and on 9 January it informed the WHO.  By 13 January 
a diagnostic test for the virus had been developed and was in use in Wuhan 
hospitals to screen for the disease.  On 15 January the virus’ genome sequence 
was shared with the WHO.  On 19 January a team of experts sent to Wuhan by 
the NHC established that the virus was spreading through human-to-human 
transmission.   
 
The second stage is characterised by the White Paper as involving ‘initial 
progress in containing the virus’.138  A national level decision to impose travel 
restrictions within and around Wuhan and the wider Hubei Province was taken 
on 22 January and implemented in the early hours of 23 January through a public 
notice issued by the Wuhan city authorities.139  This declared the closure of the 
city’s outbound routes from railway stations and airports from 10 a.m. the same 
day.  Later that day the national Ministry of Transport issued an emergency 
circular suspending the movement of passenger traffic into Wuhan by air and 
water.  On 25 January the NHC issued national guidelines on disease prevention 
governing tourism, households, public places, public transport and monitoring of 
private residences (‘home observation’).  From 2 February the Wuhan authorities 
implemented a test and trace programme under which ‘four categories of persons 
– confirmed cases, suspected cases, febrile patients who might be carriers, and 
close contacts’ –  were put under ‘classified management in designated facilities’. 
This meant taking action ‘to conduct mass screenings to identify people with 
infections, hospitalise them, and collect accurate data on case numbers’.140   Two 
emergency hospitals were constructed to deal with serious cases, eventually 
providing for 9,000 beds; in addition, 16 temporary treatment centres or ‘shelter 
hospitals’ were set up for those with mild or no symptoms.141  The temporary 
treatment centres received 12,000 patients, over 8,000 of whom were discharged, 
while a further 3,500 were transferred to hospitals.  According to the White Paper, 




infection, death or relapse’.142  In the same period, two rounds of community-
based mass screening of Wuhan’s population were carried out, covering 4.1 
million households.  Further mass testing of the population of Wuhan was to 
occur later in 2020 when a small number of new infections were reported.143 
 
The Wuhan-level responses were supported by a national-level mobilisation of 
resources.  Beginning on 24 January, medical support teams were dispatched to 
Wuhan from around the country. The White Paper reports that over the ‘ensuring 
period’ (unspecified), a total of ‘346 medical teams composed of 42,600 medical 
workers and 965 public health workers from across the country and the armed 
forces’ were sent to Hubei Province.144  During the peak of the testing carried out 
in Wuhan in February, there were over 1,800 teams of epidemiologists, with a 
minimum number of five people each, between them tracing tens of thousands of 
contacts.  According to the Joint Report, ‘contact follow-up is painstaking, with 
a high percentage of identified close contacts completing medical observation’.145  
Across several other cities and provinces, a contact tracing rate of approaching 
100% was reported, with around 70% of those contacted subsequently 
undergoing medical treatment, with a reported infection rate for this group of 
between 1% and 5%.  
 
In the third stage, as levels of infection began to fall both in Wuhan and in the 
rest of the country, the response took the form of the coordination of ‘epidemic 
control with economic and social development’ along with the organisation of 
‘an orderly return to work and daily life’.146  By 14 February the number of 
reported daily cases outside Hubei had been continuously falling for 10 days, and 
by 18 February the number of cured and discharged patients was greater than 
those being admitted.  By 19 February this pattern was also observed in Wuhan.  
On 21 February traffic restrictions outside Wuhan and Beijing began to be lifted, 
and on 24 February the provincial trunk road system was reopened.   At the point 
the WHO declared Covid-19 a pandemic on 11 March, the Chinese authorities 
had already restored normal internal travel arrangements, while at the same time 
taking steps to impose quarantine and health checks at its external borders. 
 
(ii) The Joint Report’s assessment 
 
The WHO-China Joint Mission issued its report on 29 February; it is dated 16-24 
February.  The report concluded that ‘in the face of a previously unknown virus, 
China has rolled out perhaps the most ambitious, agile and aggressive disease 
effort containment in history’.147  The key steps were identified as ‘extremely 
proactive surveillance to detect cases, very rapid diagnosis and immediate case 
isolation, rigorous tracking and quarantine of close contacts, and an exceptionally 
high degree of population understanding and acceptance of these measures’.  On 




people to collective action in the face of this common threat’148 although without 
going into detail on precisely what ‘collective action’ means in this context or on 
how a high rate of community-level compliance with control measures was 
secured.  The report does not hold back from ascribing impacts to the measures 
taken, although again in a somewhat broad-brush way: the response had ‘changed 
the course of a rapidly escalating and deadly epidemic’.  It was a ‘rather unique 
and unprecedented public health response’ and at the same time one with ‘vital 
lessons’ beyond China, since the steps taken there were ‘the only measures 
currently proven to interrupt or minimise transmission chains in humans’.149   
 
(iii) The White Paper’s assessment 
 
The Chinese government’s White Paper, published a few months later in June 
2020, goes into more detail in its evaluation of the response.  This part of the 
document, labelled an ‘assessment’, can be understood as the Chinese 
government’s evaluation of its own performance.  As such, it is an attempt to 
justify its approach, to differentiate it from those of countries which had, as was 
already clear by June, followed a different path, and to address emerging 
criticisms, in particular the complaint that it had not shared information with the 
WHO or other countries during the early stages of the epidemic.  As already 
noted,150 while the White Paper contains a large amount of factual information, it 
cannot be taken at face value as a description of events.  It is, on the other hand, 
revealing for what it says about the Chinese state’s understanding of the way in 
which Covid-19 was, in a broad sense, ‘governed’: the document was intended 
by the Chinese government as ‘to keep a record of China’s efforts in its own fight 
against the virus, to share its experience with the rest of the world, and to clarify 
its ideas on the global battle’.151 
 
The first aspect of governance to be emphasised in the White Paper is what the 
document calls ‘centralised and efficient command’. 152  This is defined as a 
system in which ‘the central authorities exercise overall command while local 
authorities and all sectors follow the leadership and instructions of the central 
authorities’. 153   The stress here is on the leadership role played by national 
officials including the state President and Premier, and core committees of the 
party, above all the Chinese Communist Party central committee.   
 
The second aspect of the response to receive emphasis is what the White Paper 
calls ‘a tight prevention and control system involving all sectors of society’.154  
Here the focus is on the role of community-based monitoring of the health of the 
population.  Screening was carried out across the country with ‘all residents… 
required to report their health condition on a daily basis’, while ‘community 
workers for their part visited households door-to-door to collect and verify this 




be responsible for ‘effectively [stopping] the virus from spreading nationwide’.156  
The extension of the Chinese New Year holiday in January, the postponement of 
the spring semester in schools and the closure of cinemas, theatres, internet cafés 
and gyms are also cited here, along with the introduction of protective procedures 
for essential public spaces and facilities including the disinfection of buildings.  
The strictness of control measures in the areas affected by quarantine are 
highlighted: 
 
In Wuhan, rigorous 24-hour access control was enforced in all 
residential communities.  No residents were allowed to leave and no 
non-residents allowed to access the community area other than for 
essential medical needs or epidemic control operations.  Community 
workers were responsible for purchase and delivery of daily necessities 
according to residents’ needs.  This approach was also applied in 
communities and villages in other parts of China, where all residents 
had to register and undergo temperature checking when leaving or 
entering the residential area or village.157 
 
At the same time, the White Paper sees the element of ‘control’ in its response as 
complemented, and to some degree mitigated, by several other factors. The first 
is community-level involvement in  the implementation of the restrictions. Thus 
‘strict access control and grid-based management were exercised in communities 
and human and material resources were channelled down to the community 
level’; similarly, it was by ‘securing full implementation of response measures 
down to the lowest level’ that communities and villages were made safe.158 
 
The second factor to offset the restrictive nature of quarantines is the extensive 
find, test, trace, isolate and support system through which the epidemic was 
managed.  As already noted,159 this included the provision of food and other 
necessary supplies to communities in quarantine; mass testing of the population 
of the affected areas; community based tracing of those with symptoms; isolation 
and treatment of those testing positive in the ‘shelter hospitals’.   In addition, 
medical insurance policies were adjusted to ensure that patients receiving 
treatment for Covid-19 did not have to meet additional costs.160  By these various 
means, what the report calls an ‘all-out effort to treat patients and save lives’ was 
achieved.161 
 
The third offsetting factor is that the restrictive measures were enacted and 
implemented according to formal legal interventions of various kinds.  Specific 
legal measures highlighted include the enactment of emergency regulations for 
infection control, the passage of laws to ensure market order against price-
gouging and counterfeit goods, and the introduction of measures to facilitate the 




quarantine and travel restriction laws were ‘consistent with relevant provisions of 
international law and other domestic laws’, while ‘the law is enforced in a strict, 
impartial, procedure-based, and non-abusive way’.162  
 
The final element to receive emphasis is the role of expert advice in determining 
the nature and extent of the restrictions: ‘prevention and control efforts have been 
based on science’. Reference is made to reliance on ‘timely analyses and 
assessments by scientists and public health experts’. As additional knowledge of 
the virus became available, the response was tailored to new information: ‘China 
has modified and optimised its response measures in a timely manner to make 
them more effective’.163 This resulted in the production of medical protocols, 
technical manuals on infection control, and work plans on psychological 
counselling.  It is under the heading of science and technology that the role of 
‘big data and artificial intelligence’ in epidemic control receives a discussion.164 
 
The Joint Report makes an explicit endorsement of the Chinese approach and of 
its relevance for other countries: ‘China’s uncompromising and rigorous use of 
non-pharmaceutical measures to contain transmission of the COVID-19 virus in 
multiple settings provides vital lessons for the global response’.165  The tone of 
the White Paper is more cautious on the wider lessons to be drawn, mindful that 
by this point ‘certain countries’ which had ‘ignored’ information coming from 
China about its response were now blaming China ‘for their own failure to 
respond to the epidemic and protect their people’s lives’. 166   Against this 
background, the White Paper stops short of suggesting that the Chinese 
experience should be replicated elsewhere, largely limiting itself to making calls 
for enhanced international cooperation in addressing the pandemic.  Nor does it 
claim that the measures taken, with the possible exception of the shelter hospitals, 
were new.  Citing comments made at the press conference to launch the Joint 
WHO-China Report in Beijing in February, it refers to an ‘all-of-government, all-
of-society approach’ which had ‘prevented at least tens of thousands, but 
probably hundreds of thousands of cases of Covid-19 in China’ as ‘very old-
fashioned, too old in some ways’.167  
 
B. Wuhan as ‘exception’: libertarian and critical readings of state power 
 
The reference to the Wuhan measures as ‘too old’ does not appear in the published 
version of the Joint Report, and beyond China these measures was represented 
from an early stage as being far from ‘old-fashioned’, but in various ways novel 
and exceptional. This process began immediately following the publication of the 
Joint Report at the end of February 2020.   An article which appeared in the 
journal Science on 3 March 2020 to mark the publication of the Report 
highlighted not just the scale and strictness of the Wuhan measures but their 




response as unusual in the context of his ‘20, 30 years in this business’.  The 
article cited a US-based epidemiologist who thought that the Chinese experience 
‘poses difficult questions for all countries currently considering their response to 
Covid-19’, and an American legal scholar who saw ‘very good reasons for 
countries to hesitate using these kinds of extreme measures’.   This was because 
‘China is unique in that is has a political system that can gain public compliance 
with extreme measures’.  Another US-based legal scholar and China specialist 
referred to ‘things that would work to stop an outbreak that we would consider 
abhorrent in a free and just society’. A public health expert from the UK was 
quoted as saying of the Joint Report, ‘the one thing that’s completely glossed over 
is the human rights dimension’.169   
 
Notwithstanding these doubts, by the end of March other countries were 
implementing quarantines and travel restrictions, in some cases across national 
territories (as in most of western Europe at this point) or at state or provincial 
level (as in several US states).  These national responses differed in their degree 
of strictness and in their resulting implications for normal social and commercial 
activity.170  Many countries adopted elements of the Wuhan measures, although 
the practice of using shelter hospitals to care for those infected with only mild or 
no symptoms does not appear to have been widely followed elsewhere.   
 
In east Asian countries, nationwide quarantines and travel restrictions were 
largely avoided, with emphasis placed instead on community-based test and trace 
systems to identify regional clusters and the use of localised restrictions within 
countries alongside external border controls to limit transmission.  The rapid 
responses of these countries, which began in January 2020 shortly after the first 
reports of fatalities in Wuhan, and their early success in limiting the spread of the 
virus and subsequently controlling it, have been attributed in part to their 
experience of managing the SARS 1 epidemic in 2002-3, 171  although a full 
assessment of this and other possible explanations must await further research.  
In Europe, control measures were not implemented until the start of March. They 
included the mandating of self-isolation for those reporting symptoms, the 
encouragement of social distancing, banning of public events, school closures, 
and quarantines (‘lockdowns’).  The first country to implement a nationwide 
lockdown, in on 11 March, was Italy; the UK was one of the last, on 24 March.172 
 
When the worldwide response is considered, what stands out is not only the wide 
degree of variation in responses, but the presence of a significant number of 
countries in which control measures were actively resisted in some periods and 
half-heartedly implemented in others, on the grounds that they were exceptional, 
unnecessary and counter-productive.  While few if any countries were entirely 
inactive, some limited their interventions out of a conscious preference for 




a belief that the virus would run its course, with limited or manageable 
consequences, if left alone to do so. 
 
In the USA claims of this type were promoted by ‘free market’ think tanks and in 
branches of academic scholarship to which they are closely connected, including 
the economic analysis of law.  Articles published under the auspices of the 
Hoover Institution173 from March 2020 argued that the exercise of police powers 
in response to the virus was an example of regulatory overreach.174  ‘Adaptive’ 
processes which would ensure a natural decline in infection and mortality rates 
were contrasted with ‘coercive measures’: 
 
we are flirting with a social meltdown. The best way to minimize that 
problem is to rely more heavily on private responses to the difficulty 
and to be relatively cautious in applying broad coercive measures that 
will shut down the productive institutions of society by government 
fiat. The Hayekian insight about how decentralized institutions have a 
comparative advantage in dealing with complex issues should not be 
forgotten, even in a legal system that has long recognized the legitimate 
interests of the state police power to deal with health and safety 
issues.175 
 
The practical implication of this position was that lockdowns then underway 
should not be unduly extended: ‘the only solution that has a prayer of working is 
to ease restrictions as quickly as possible in those areas where the risks are lower, 
such as virtually all rural areas, and major centers that have only a low incidence 
of reported deaths’.176  The early lifting of quarantines and travel restrictions in 
the US South and Mid-West which began in the first week of May 2020 was 
subsequently linked to a revival in infection and mortality rates in those parts of 
the country.177   
 
In the UK, delays in implementing quarantines and social distancing in the middle 
of March seem to have been linked to a similar belief in the self-adjusting 
properties of the epidemic.  On 3 February the UK Prime Minister gave a speech 
at Greenwich in which he observed that  
 
we are starting to hear some bizarre autarkic rhetoric, when barriers are 
going up, and when there is a risk that new diseases such as coronavirus 
will trigger a panic and a desire for market segregation that go beyond 
what is medically rational to the point of doing real and unnecessary 
economic damage, then at that moment humanity needs some 
government somewhere that is willing at least to make the case 
powerfully for freedom of exchange… of the right of the populations 





In the second week of March the UK government scaled back its Covid-19 test 
and trace programme.179 At the same time senior officials publicly endorsed the 
idea of pursuing a ‘herd immunity’ strategy for allowing the effects of the virus 
to abate of its own accord, without the need for a directed response.180  It seems 
that during this period of delay, which is now thought to have had a significant 
impact on the resulting high infection and fatality rate, the view in government 
circles was that behavioural ‘nudges’ would suffice to achieve a ‘controlled’ 
outcome.181   
 
When, a few days later, the UK government’s policy shifted towards the 
implementation of a nationwide ‘lockdown’ involving a mixture of quarantining, 
social distancing and restrictions on travel, the suggestion that it had ever been 
its intention to pursue ‘herd immunity’ was formally denied.182  However, in 
common with the USA but in contrast to several other countries, the UK has at 
no point adopted a nationwide policy of seeking to suppress the virus as opposed 
to containing its effects.183   
 
In mainland Europe, lockdowns were challenged from a perspective which, while 
having a very different foundation (critical theory), arrived at a similar conclusion 
on the illegitimate nature of the state’s response.  The ‘police’ measures taken in 
response to the crisis were seen as an instance of a ‘state of exception’, in which 
the rule of law is set aside, in conditions of emergency, by the executive power 
of the sovereign.184  The response to the virus was ‘frenetic, irrational and entirely 
unfounded’.185  In mid-March, as cases in Italy peaked, it was suggested that 
control measures there were ‘clearly showing that the state of exception, which 
governments began to accustom us to years ago, has become an authentically 
normal condition’.  This was one in which ‘men have become so used to living 
in conditions of permanent crisis and emergency that they don’t seem to notice 
that their lives have been reduced to a purely biological condition’.186  This view 
nonetheless remained an outlier with no significant take up in official circles, in 
contrast to the explicit adoption of libertarian narratives by the US and British 
governments. 
 
Those narratives did not prevent the governments concerned from taking and 
exercising the very ‘coercive’ powers which libertarian critics had warned 
against.  However, the neoliberal state, like the laissez-faire state of the nineteenth 
century,187 has never lacked the ability to exercise disciplinary and even punitive 
powers when the occasion demands.188  What it lacks, as the Covid-19 emergency 
shows, is the capacity to organise a combined community and state level response 
of the kind needed to manage the risks posed by the infectious disease in an 
effective way.  Thjs very absence increases the likelihood of the state resorting to 




number of regions within the UK were once again experiencing a strict version 
of lockdown in response to a second wave of the epidemic, and national level 
lockdowns of varying degrees of length and severity were being considered.189   
The British government’s consideration of the ‘blunt tool’190 of a second national 
lockdown in October 2020 was understood to be the unavoidable result of its 
failure to organise an effective find, test, trace, isolate and support system during 
the interval provided by the first one.191  At the start of the second wave, fines for 
non-compliance with self-isolation orders were increased and steps taken to 
supply individual test and trace data to local police forces.192  The practice of 
requiring customers in shops and restaurants and employees generally to 
download and activate mobile test and trace apps was also becoming 
widespread.193 
 
In this respect, again, the Chinese experience is easily misunderstood if it seen 
only in terms of its ‘stringency’.  China has only applied lockdowns to specific 
cities and regions, and they have been of shorter duration than those operating in 
the UK and other European countries.194  Mass testing and concerted support 
systems have made it unnecessary for the Chinese authorities to resort to 
lockdowns of the British type.195  Nor can this be said to be a function of China’s 
system of one-party rule; general lockdowns have also been avoided in 
democracies which have managed the virus successfully in east Asia (Korea and 
Taiwan), South America (Uruguay) and Europe (Denmark, Norway and Finland), 
among others.196 
 
5 Learning from (and forgetting) history  
 
A.  Antecedents of Wuhan: Florence 1629, Eyam 1665, London 1853, 
Leicester 1892  
 
In Discipline and Punish, published in 1975, Foucault vividly describes the 
history of ‘the plague‐stricken town, traversed throughout with hierarchy, 
surveillance, observation, writing; the town immobilized by the functioning of an 
extensive power that bears in a distinct way over all individual bodies – that is 
the utopia of the perfectly governed city’.197  Publicly-enforced quarantines and 
cordons sanitaires are indeed among the oldest means used to check the spread of 
infectious disease.  Quarantines are first recorded in the city ports of the Adriatic 
coast around the turn of the fifteenth century.198  The earliest examples of their 
use in England date from the sixteenth century, when the Tudor monarchs applied 
continental methods of disease control, initially to protect themselves and their 
court, but increasingly with a view to limiting outbreaks in the population.  Orders 
in council were issued by Elizabeth I’s government in 1573; in them, ‘sanitation 
replaced prayer, Galenic bodily regimens aimed at balance replaced religious 




enforced by justices of the peace not clergy’.199  James I’s Plague Act of 1604,200 
which prioritised the public relief of the those affected by disease in in order to 
make quarantining effective, set the template for public disease control for the 
rest of the century.201 
 
Plague was the ‘first pathogen successively defeated by human action in 
Europe’.202  Today, it is treatable by antibiotics, but scientific discoveries were 
not the reason for its decline.  Its spread was limited, before modern medical 
interventions became possible, by systematic quarantining and monitoring which 
became widespread on the mainland of Europe during the course of the 
seventeenth century.  Critical also was the use of public support measures to 
complement quarantines.  When the plague struck Florence in 1631, the measures 
implemented by the city’s authorities included home confinement, daily health 
checks for residents of affected areas, and the forced hospitalisation of those 
showing symptoms.  The rules were enforced through a mixtures of fines and 
imprisonment.  At the same time, the city organised the distribution of food to 
residents unable to leave their homes, using public funds for this purpose.  Partly 
because of the extensive support it could provide to its residents, Florence’s 
enforcement of plague regulations was stricter, and went on for longer, than in 
other Italian city states, but the city also experienced a lower mortality rate.203 
The English approach to the implementation of similar control and support 
measures was less effective, which is thought to be why London experienced 
repeated episodes of plague, resulting in a mortality rate of up to a fifth of the 
population, until  the last major outbreak in 1665-6.204   
 
The history of epidemic control tells us that debates about the balance to be struck 
between state enforcement and community-level self-organisation are nothing 
new.  How far the experience of the Derbyshire village of Eyam, whose 
population self-isolated when the plague spread from London in 1665, was 
entirely down to community action, has been questioned.205  Quarantining of 
towns and villages was not unusual at this time, and was sometimes imposed by 
neighbouring communities in return for the provision of food supplies.206  Eyam 
may best be thought of as representing a combination of public pressure and 
community-level response which is not so far removed from what was 
undertaken, if on a vastly larger scale, in Wuhan; in the spring of 2020, Chinese 
commentators were among those making this comparison.207 
 
Infectious disease continued to be the major cause of death in British towns and 
cities into the nineteenth century, and births only began to outnumber of deaths 
in London from 1800; until that point, the city’s population growth was entirely 
the result of inward migration from the countryside and towns.208  Smallpox 
throughout the eighteenth century, cholera in the nineteenth, and tuberculosis 




middle of the twentieth century the ‘epidemiological transition’209 which had 
begun in the seventeenth was largely complete: from this point, not just in western 
Europe but increasingly at global level, mortality rates from infectious disease 
began to flatline and fall, and national life expectancies, with few exceptions, 
showed consistent and prolonged increases.  
 
The histories of smallpox and cholera are instructive.  They became endemic in 
English towns and cities during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
respectively.  ‘Endemicisation’, in this sense, means that a pathogen becomes 
permanently present in a population.  Over time, deaths from both smallpox and 
cholera stabilised and parts of the population achieved an immunity, but mortality 
rates continued at a high level, in particular for the young: exposure during 
infancy reduced the death rates among those who survived childhood.210   
 
Smallpox in England was eradicated after 1800 through a combination of 
vaccination and disease control.  Inoculation against the disease had been 
introduced in the early eighteenth century following a practice first adopted in the 
Ottoman Empire, and became more widespread after Jenner’s refinement of the 
technique to produce the world’s first vaccine in 1796.211  There were isolated 
outbreaks of smallpox as late as the 1890s.  In the Midlands city of Leicester, a 
smallpox epidemic in 1893-4 was brought under control through a combination 
of hospitalisation and home-based quarantine.  Affected families were confined 
to their homes for 16 days under external supervision, during which time the 
wages of the principal earner were paid by the local government authority, at this 
time the city corporation.212  An account of what became known as the ‘Leicester 
method’ was contained in the final report of the Royal Commission on 
Vaccination in 1896,213 and half a century later became the basis for the WHO’s 
worldwide programme of smallpox eradication, the only one so far to result in 
the effective global elimination of a major pathogen.214 
 
Cholera was brought under control through a mixture of public health 
interventions and scientific discoveries which established its nature as a water-
borne disease.  What would be now be called ‘community tracing’ was first used 
in London in 1853 to establish the sources of the disease in inadequate sanitation 
of the water supply, some twenty years after the city’s first Cholera outbreak.215  
In the following decades, systems of communication, at first nationwide and then 
extended along transnational shipping routes, were put in place to track the spread 
of the disease.  Other water-borne diseases including typhus and malaria, which 
had become endemic in parts of the English countryside, were suppressed through 
a combination of water drainage and agricultural improvements.  Malaria was 
common in the fen country adjacent to the city of Cambridge until the final 
quarter of the nineteenth century.216  The steady decline in tuberculosis in British 




to rising living standards, improvements in nutrition and reductions in residential 
overcrowding, as it did to the medical advances which resulted in the widespread 
availability of antibiotic treatments.217 
 
In so far as the control of disease can be understood in ‘biopolitical’ terms, the 
coevolution of growing state capacity, on the one hand, and falling trends in 
infectivity and mortality rates on the other, should be part of that understanding.  
The measures taken to mitigate the effects of novel pathogens and ultimately to 
bring them under control were not just a function of the degree of control 
exercised by governments.  More important than stringency was the mobilisation 
of knowledge on the part of the state.  In the seventeenth century, diseases such 
as the plague were barely understood, and the measures taken to address them did 
not in any practical sense address their transmission through poor sanitation and 
residential over-crowding.  By the middle of the nineteenth century this was 
changing: cholera was no longer thought to be the result of a diffuse and 
uncontrollable ‘miasma’ of conditions,218 but specifically sourced to impurities 
in the water supply.219  From this point on, disease control was increasingly 
organised around the collection of statistics, not just on the incidence of disease 
and the conditions of health among populations, but on societal vectors of 
transmission including rates of poverty and relative deprivation.  As Foucault 
himself put it in a lecture series presented after the publication of Discipline and 
Punish, and which reflects the evolution of his conception of the state, the result 
was: 
 
a medicine whose main function will now be public hygiene, with 
institutions to coordinate medical care, centralize power, and normalize 
knowledge. And which also takes the form of campaigns to teach 
hygiene and medicalize the population. So, problems of reproduction, 
the birth rate, and the problem of the mortality rate too.220 
 
This shift in the practice of medicine, which can be summed up in the idea 
of ‘public health’ as a collective good financed through and supplied by the 
state, was accompanied by wider changes in governmentality, understood as 
the practice of government, and in the form of law.  This was epitomised by 
the transformation of the workhouse, an institution designed to coerce the 
poor and contain the diseased, to the public hospital, funded from social 
insurance and general taxation.221 Juridically, it was marked by the transition 
from the disciplinary ‘poor law’ to the modern law of ‘social security’, 
constructed on the principle of the sharing of risks on a population-wide 
basis.222  These developments, through which nation states consolidated 






B. Transnational knowledge diffusion: the role of the WHO 
 
Beginning in the middle decades of the nineteenth century, attempts were made 
to embed the emerging lessons of disease control in international protocols and 
standards.  Early experiments in information sharing and coordination of national 
responses to cholera took the form of international sanitary conferences, the first 
of which was held in Paris in 1851.  These initiatives gradually assumed a more 
institutionalised and permanent form which culminated with the founding of the 
World Health Organization in April 1948.223  The WHO’s Health Emergencies 
Programme, updated in 2019, seeks to ensure that ‘all countries are equipped to 
mitigate risk from high-threat infectious hazards’ and that ‘all countries assess 
and address critical gaps in preparedness for health emergencies, including in 
core capacities’.224  Recognising that ‘stronger and more resilient national health 
systems will be backed by the regional and global alert and response mechanisms 
that will provide early warning and coordinate the international support required 
to contain and mitigate the impact of health emergencies’, the Organization is 
committed to working ‘with partners to identify and coordinate the research, 
development and innovation needed to better detect, prevent and respond to new 
and emerging diseases and other sources of risk’.225 
 
As an international agency, however, the WHO lacks precisely those coercive 
powers which are available to states engaged in the practice of ‘biopolitics’.  The 
International Health Regulations (‘IHRs’), adopted in 1969 and revised in 2005, 
are intended to ‘prevent, protect against, control, and provide a public health 
response to the international spread of disease in ways that are commensurate 
with and restricted to public health risks and that avoid unnecessary interference 
with international traffic and trade’.226  In their legal form the Regulations are a 
treaty, and so binding upon their state parties (nearly 200 countries) as a matter 
of international law.  In practice, however, there are few step that the WHO can 
take in response to a country’s failure to comply with the IHRs concerning disease 
notification. 227  The form of the notification process gives rise to a  ‘social 
dilemma’ in which a country experiencing an outbreak will be reluctant to report 
it because of the risk it will then be barred from access to international trade and 
free movement of people and resources.228  Having no sanctions at its disposal, 
the WHO’s response has been to place emphasis instead on the provision of 
resources and support to increase states’ capabilities for monitoring and 
responding to health risks.229 
 
With specific reference to zoonotic diseases, the WHO has developed a series of 
indicators which benchmark states’ levels of readiness by reference to factors 
which include food safety standards, in-service training capacities, and resourcing 
of emergency response teams.  Information on the indicators and their 




External Evaluation Tool (‘JEE’), first published in 2005 and revised in 2018.  A 
core identifying feature of this process is that is not mandatory for the member 
state taking part in it, and that its effects operate largely at the level of information 
exchange and peer review: ‘JEEs have a number of important features including: 
voluntary country participation; a multisectoral approach by both the external 
teams and the host countries; transparency and openness of data and 
information sharing; and the public release of reports’ 230  (emphasis in 
original).   
 
In their stress on seeking to achieve compliance through information generation 
rather than sanctioning, the JEEs embed some of the lessons of contemporary 
governance research, including the limits of what can be achieved through 
coercive control in the absence of community action.231  The WHO, in common 
with other UN agencies with a social mandate such as the International Labour 
Organization, has no option but to operate through consensus and persuasion, 
because it has been denied the power to do otherwise.  Powers of enforcement are 
available, on the other hand, to agencies charged with responsibility for the 
maintenance of the global trading system.  The World Trade Organization, 
formally established outside the framework of the United Nations, has been 
granted powers of adjudication and enforcement which are designed to penalise 
breaches of its rules.  The World Bank and International Monetary Fund, agencies 
of the UN but more generously funded than the WHO or ILO, are able through 
the principle of ‘conditionality’ to use the resources at their disposal to ensure 
compliance with policy recommendations.232 
 
This is not to suggest that the monitoring and information diffusion role of the 
WHO should be neglected.  The WHO’s response to SARS 1 in 2003 is widely 
thought to have been timely and effective, and the lessons from that episode were 
embedded its protocols and in pandemic planning in a number of countries.  The 
experience of the SARS 1 epidemic, in particular the need for speed of response 
as well as the value of early restrictions travel both within and between countries, 
informed the WHO’s guidance on the response to Covid-19, and appears to have 
been factor in the suppression strategy adopted by several east Asian countries in 
the early weeks of 2020.233   
 
It can be no surprise that the WHO has been criticised for being too slow to notify 
countries of the dangers of the SARS-Covid-2 pathogen after it was alerted to its 
properties in January 2020, and for only declaring Covid-19 a pandemic in 
March.  This criticism, however, needs to be understood in the context of the 
WHO’s limited capacities.  Its inability, in common with other international 
agencies with a social remit, to mobilise the power of ‘government’ of the kind 





Criticisms of the WHO notwithstanding, the Organization has a principal role in 
the Covid-19 crisis as the global repository of information and source of guidance 
on best practice, and has been performing that role since the very beginning of 
the emergency. 235   Very few of the control measures and public health 
interventions made by governments during 2020 are new, the Chinese shelter 
hospitals being one of the few of which this could be said;236 the remainder have 
their origins in standards formulated and developed by WHO and its international 
predecessors on the basis of national experiences, the ‘Leicester method’ being 
just one, particularly pertinent, example.237 
 
6.  Assessment and Conclusion  
 
We are still in the early stages of a pandemic episode whose eventual trajectory 
cannot be straightforwardly predicted.  The difficulty in knowing how the 
pandemic will play out is not just the result of limitations in the understanding of 
its virology and epidemiology.  There is as yet no consensus on how it will or 
should be governed.  We see not just a wide divergence in states’ reactions, but 
in the characterisation of the control and support measures taken in countries 
which have so far been successful in repressing the virus.  In many countries, 
influential voices, within and beyond government, see control measures of this 
kind as, in varying degrees, unnecessary and counter-productive.  The view that 
control interventions are unnecessary tends to go hand in hand with the idea that 
complementary support mechanisms should also be limited in their scale and 
duration.238  At the root of this view is a particular understanding of the role of 
governance and of government: self-adjusting mechanisms in society, politics, 
and law, mirroring those in nature, will ensure an optimal resolution to the 
pandemic.  State intervention and planning, if pursued at scale and over any 
significant duration of time, are likely to degenerate into coercion and control.  
 
In the preceding sections of this paper we reviewed and assessed the emerging 
evidence on the nature of states’ responses, with a focus on the Chinese case.  The 
measures taken in Wuhan in early months of 2020, far from being unprecedented, 
were in line with, and in a very real sense the culmination of, public health 
responses which, over the course of several centuries, achieved an 
epidemiological transition and mortality revolution in the countries of the global 
North.  Industrialisation, urbanisation and the growth of trade, along with 
movements of populations, created the conditions for the major pandemics of the 
modern era, but made it possible for them to be managed and brought under 
control.  They produced a type of state, a social or welfare state, which had the 
capacity to respond to the risks posed by infectious diseases, and, over time, to 
control and suppress them.  At the core of both developments – the rise of industry 
and commerce, on the one hand, and the emergence of a state with the resources 




of knowledge.  Alongside the privately held and decentralised knowledge of the 
market, the social state mobilised knowledge that was publicly organised and 
centralised.  As this process continued, there was a related shift in the form of the 
state: its capacity to act through the application of knowledge grew in inverse 
proportion to its use of coercion to achieve its ends.   
 
When we understand the history of pandemic control in this way, we can begin 
to formulate some likely scenarios for the trajectory of the current crisis.  
‘Normalising’ Covid-19 by treating it as a natural event which will eventually 
recede without the need for concerted action will not work very well for any state 
attempting it.  In that event, the disease will become endemic: as with smallpox 
and cholera in the relatively recent past.  Covid-19 will become stable and in a 
sense manageable, but still a serious health risk to certain parts of the population, 
and a continuing drain on scarce resources.   
 
But it is also important to stress that policies which treat the virus and society 
alike as self-adjusting systems will not in practice lead to the hoped-for 
minimisation of state control.  In the absence of a concerted public health 
response based on the logic of ‘find, test, trace, isolate and support’, periodic 
waves of the virus will be met by repeated lockdowns. These are likely to be 
accompanied by a renewed emphasis on the disciplining and control of the 
population.  The same process will also give rise to new variants of the idea that 
populations, not governments, are to blame for the persistence of the pandemic 
and its associated social and economic costs.  The neoliberal state is one in which 
outcomes are attributed to the decisions taken by individuals.  If Covid-19 
becomes endemic in societies organised according to this principle, it will not be 
seen as the responsibility of government, but of the groups within the population 
which are most exposed to its effects, above all those at risk through poverty, 
overcrowding and dangerous working conditions.   
 
There is an alternative path, one in which the risks associated with Covid-19 are 
recognised and governed in a systematic and concerted way.  Of necessity this 
will involve new, or renewed, understanding of the importance of public 
governance delivered by a democratically constituted and accountable state.   The 
social state of the middle decades of the twentieth century solved the collective 
action problem inherent in the industrial capitalism of the time by constructing a 
consensus around the need for a society-wide, cross-generational pooling of risks.  
That achievement was eroded away by several decades of neoliberal theorising 
and policy making, but not to the extent that reconstruction is impossible. The 
history of social security, as of labour law, is one of alternating cycles,239 and the 
Covid-19 emergency will provide opportunities to institute a new, progressive 





To manage risks they must first be recognised as humanly created, rather than 
purely natural or material events, and social, that is to say collective, in their 
origins and effects, as opposed to being solely the result of individual decision 
making.  Thus to recognise risk in the case of Covid-19 means seeing the 
pandemic not as a natural event, or as a chance occurrence, but as the result of 
human action and institutions.  Pandemics are a predictable result of the rise of 
industry, the globalisation of commerce and trade, and the movement of goods 
and peoples.  They are a structural consequence of a system which undervalues 
the environment and fails to price in the effects of its degradation.  This system 
is not just social and economic, but also legal: it is the result of legal institutions 
which permit and legitimise the commodification of the natural world.    
 
At the same time, to recognise the risk of pandemic as Anthropogenic – as the 
result, that is, of feedback from the natural environment in response to human 
activity – is to begin to make it amenable to governance through law and other 
human institutions.  The history of the management of pandemics since the late 
medieval period shows that they can be contained, managed and finally 
suppressed through concerted action.  At the core of this process is the application 
of knowledge of various kinds, in some contexts, decentralised and private, but 
in others centralised and public.   
 
Does placing a renewed emphasis on the role of the state in systems of governance 
put us on a pathway to authoritarianism; according to alternative theoretical 
priors, a ‘road to serfdom’ or ‘state of exception’?  It is not mistaken to identify 
in the neoliberal state, or states more generally, the possibility of a coercive 
response to the Covid-19 crisis.  However, this outcome is, we suggest, less likely 
in contexts where the disease is brought under systematic control though the 
public interventions which are characteristic of a functioning social state.  In those 
countries where the disease is allowed to become endemic through inaction, as a 
result (among other things) of a preference for neoliberal modes of governance, 
we are likely to see the state assuming new ‘biopolitical’ powers.  The future of 
the neoliberal state will be an increasingly coercive one.  But it will also be 
ineffective: if a system of governance is ultimately successful according to how 
far it is able to process external risks to its mode of operation, the experience of 
Covid-19 to date is that neoliberal systems are inherently ill-equipped to manage 
the risks of the Anthropocene era. 
 
Finding an alternative path should begin with rethinking currently influential 
accounts of governance and governmentality which see the ‘prison’ and the 
‘clinic’ as lying on the same continuum, and view authoritarianism as the 
preordained outcome of the welfare or social state.  These theories precisely 
invert the relationship between knowledge and coercion that we can observe in 




knowledge that the state was able to reduce its reliance on coercion for the 
management of risks to human populations; social insurance replaced the poor 
law, and the hospital superseded the workhouse.  A century ago, this process 
culminated in an epidemiological turning point and unprecedented stabilisation 
of human mortality rates.  Essential to this process was the realisation that poverty 
and disease were neither natural phenomena, nor the result of individual choices, 
but the consequences of human institutions, and that as such they had to be 
addressed institutionally.  This achievement, which is in danger of being 
forgotten, can be a template for the future governance of Anthropogenic risks, of 
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